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Replications Everywhere  
Why the replication crisis might be less severe than it seems at first  
Stephan Guttinger1 
 
The debate about the replication crisis in the experimental sciences is based on two key 
claims, namely 1) that researchers rarely replicate existing data and 2) that if they attempt 
to do so they more often than not fail.  
These claims have led to some serious soul-searching within the scientific community, the 
majority of the debate focusing on two issues: a) how can researchers be encouraged to 
perform more replications and b) how can it be ensured that fewer irreproducible data are 
created in the first place?  
These are not idle debates because they could have serious consequences for the way in 
which research is conducted and funded. Some proposals made in response to the crisis go 
as far as suggesting that “blue-sky” basic research should be severely restricted in favor of 
research that is directly tied to practical outcomes.[1]  
Here, I do not want to contribute to ongoing science policy debates, but instead question 
the very foundation on which these debates are built. In particular, I will argue that claim 1) 
is wrong because there is more replication going on in the experimental sciences than 
usually assumed. These replications, however, are completely ignored in the current debate 
because the analytic framework used cannot account for them. This also has implications 
for claim 2), because these additional replications are normally successful, making it likely 
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that current estimates of the failure rate for replications (ranging from 50% to 80 %[2,3]) are 
too high. This suggests that there might be less of a crisis than some analysts claim.  
This of course does not mean that issues such as better quality controls or the reporting of 
methods do not have to be addressed. Clearly, there is a lot that can be further improved in 
the experimental sciences. But what it means is that the doomsday- picture of a profound 
crisis that drives current calls for reform becomes less convincing. It also means that more 
focus should be put on getting as complete a picture of the status quo as possible before 
moving to the reform stage. The current debate, I claim, is built on flawed foundations.  
Explaining Trust in the Absence of Replication  
The starting point for my reflections here is a point that rarely receives attention in the 
debate about the replication crisis, namely the fact that for decades scientists have not 
really been worried about the lack of replications in their own line of work: even though 
most researchers are familiar with how tricky it can be to replicate the work of others (or 
their own work for that matter), they were more or less content with how things were going 
(at least in the life sciences, on which this article focuses). Of course, there were debates 
about the quality of certain assays (the Far-Western blot would be a good example) or 
materials being used. But there certainly was little or no talk of a fundamental crisis.  
What is more, researchers seem to have a deep trust in science itself and the data on which 
they are building in their own work. A recent survey conducted by Nature has confirmed 
this positive sentiment, showing that researchers still largely trust the data they are using, 
even though most of them acknowledge that, at some point in their career, they had 
problems replicating existing work.[4]  
In the conceptual framework used to assess the replication crisis it is not possible to make 
sense of this trust. According to this framework, real trust could only come about if 
replications were performed before existing data are used. But because researchers do not 
set up replication studies, they do not seem to have good reason to trust what they are 
building on. They seem to move ahead blindly, simply hoping for the best.  
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The favored explanation for this apparently risky behavior of researchers is that they are 
forced to act this way by the perverse incentive structures that are in place within the 
sciences: the dominant publish-or-perish culture leaves them with no other choice but to 
throw all caution and critical attitude overboard and to use whichever data help them to get 
the next big story published. They simply do not have the time and money to thoroughly 
check what they are working with (in a more negative reading, the implication seems to be 
that many scientists lack integrity and let their ambition get the better of them).  
Here, I want to propose a more positive take on why scientists have been doing things the 
way they have. I do not dispute that there are immense pressures on scientists to publish 
(and to publish well). And I am not saying that there are not some researchers who buckle 
under this pressure. But what I want to claim here is that scientists are not simply acting 
negligently, putting blind trust in existing data in order to get more money and to advance 
their own careers. Rather, the reason why scientists trust the data they are using is because 
there is a whole level of replication to which the current debate is completely blind. This 
form of replication, which I will call “micro- replication,” is built into everyday research 
practice. Because of this it has slipped under the radar of most analysts as current 
consensus postulates that replications are always add-ons to regular experimentation; they 
are something that has to be done on top of what researchers normally do. This flawed 
conceptual framework leads to a distorted analysis of the status quo.  
Micro-Replications: An Overlooked Source of Trust  
In what follows I take my lead from a comment Stuart Firestein makes in his book “Failure”, 
where he claims that “experiments get replicated because people from other labs use the 
published results and the methods in their own experiments.”[5]  
Firestein does not expand on this claim and he does not explain what such replication-in-
practice looks like. Here, I want to show that an underappreciated part of the experimental 
process – namely experimental controls – provide a form of replication that has so far been 
overlooked in the debate on the replication crisis, namely the above-mentioned “micro-
replications” (MRs).  
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To give an example of how MRs work I will look at a study published in PLOS Biology by 
Wang et al., who demonstrate that the choline transporter-like 1 (CTL1) protein plays a role 
in auxin regulation in Arabidopsis.[6] I chose this paper not because it has some unique 
features but because of the opposite: the paper is an exemplar of a standard research 
report. Two general features are of particular interest here: 1) like almost all studies 
published in biology journals these days, this study has not been designed as a replication of 
earlier findings. And 2), like most other studies, it builds on existing data to then develop its 
own message.  
The last point is crucial: Wang et al. are not the first ones to characterize the CTL1 protein in 
Arabidopsis. A study published in Nature Communications in 2014 by Dettmer et al. already 
reported a (different) function of CTL1, namely its involvement in sieve plate 
development.[7] Wang et al. perform their study against this backdrop of existing knowledge 
about CTL1. This matters because in order to proceed the authors first establish that their 
mutant behaves as it should (meaning: as it was reported by others before). Against this 
validation of their system they then generate further knowledge about the roles CTL1 plays 
in plant physiology.  
To validate their system – and hence their findings – Wang et al. first perform a series of 
positive controls. One such control is to show that their mutant displays the same root 
development defect that was already reported by Dettmer et al. (compare Figure 1D in 
Ref.[6] and Figure 1C in Ref.[7]). By doing so they demonstrate that the mutant plants they 
are working with are able to give insights into the effects of CTL1 mutations on plant 
development; as with any positive control, the point here is to show that their experimental 
system works in principle.  
Importantly, by performing these experimental controls, the researchers perform a small-
scale replication (MR) of existing data: they reproduce an earlier finding of another group 
using their own materials and methods (Wang et al., for instance, studied mutant plants 
that were generated using a different method than that used by Dettmer et al.). This, I 
claim, is an instantiation of the “replication-in-practice” that Firestein alludes to.  
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What is crucial in the context of the debate on the replication crisis is that the authors did 
not label their work as a replication study. This is a general feature of this form of 
replication: MRs are not mere add-ons to regular experimentation. Rather, they happen as 
an integral part of everyday research (in this case the functional characterization of a plant 
protein). This makes them a very powerful but easily overlooked form of replication.  
As the name implies, micro-replications are small-scale replications that only reproduce 
certain aspects of earlier work. But this does not mean that they lack power, especially 
given how prevalent they are: because MRs are linked to a standard element of everyday 
research practice (i.e., positive controls) they represent a potentially very large set of 
(successful) replications that pervades the literature in the experimental life sciences. It is 
also, I claim, part of what makes researchers trust in their own work and that of others.  
A New Basis on Which to Assess Reproducibility  
The current debate about the reproducibility crisis is completely blind to the additional level 
of micro-replications, as the analytic framework used only thinks of replications as add-ons 
and not as part of regular experimentation. This leads analysts to conclude that researchers 
simply do not perform any replications and seem blindly to trust existing data. Once we 
expand our picture of replications, however, we end up with a very different assessment of 
the status quo – one in which with a significantly higher number of small-scale replications is 
performed on a regular basis. This changes the very foundation on which the debate about 
the replication crisis is built.  
All of this is not to say that the current experimental sciences do not have to be improved. 
Surely, there are studies out there that cannot be reproduced and there are cases in which 
researchers use flawed materials (e.g., particular antibodies or contaminated cell lines). The 
ongoing debate about improving reporting and quality control is therefore still relevant and 
important. And if we can get researchers to do even more replications then surely that is 
also a good thing. Some existing data might for instance not be of the type that are used as 
a positive control or starting point for a new study and will therefore not be covered by 
MRs. There is a lot more that we need to learn about how MRs work and how prevalent 
(and powerful) they are.  
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But the discussion here shows that there might be less need to fundamentally revise the 
experimental sciences than current talk of a “crisis” often implies. There is good reason to 
assume that (successful) replications are much more prevalent. This, then, is not a call for 
inaction but for a revision of the foundations on which action is taken. In our efforts to 
further improve the experimental sciences, we have to make sure that we proceed with as 
complete an understanding of the status quo as possible. Taking into account MRs, I claim, 
will have to be part of this process.  
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